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Introduction
The law on takeovers, as it has developed in the European Union, dif-
fers in substance and spirit from the U.S. approach. What are those differ-
ences, and how can they be explained?1 The thesis of this paper is that
takeover regulation in both regions is shaped by two principal factors: (1)
differences in the political power of targets and bidders at different geo-
graphic levels and (2) the respective political power of bidders and targets
within a given geographic area. The observed pattern is consistent with
this simple model: takeover regulation in both Europe and the United
States becomes increasingly bidder-friendly with increasing geographic
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1. See generally Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe's Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover
Regulation: Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT'L LJ. 171
(2006) (comparing U.S. and E.U. takeover law).
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scope and, within jurisdictions, reflects the respective political interests of
bidder and target firms.2
I. The Model
Consider a simple political system consisting of a large sovereign
entity with power to set binding rules within its borders and a set of
smaller entities, existing within the larger entity, that have sovereign
authority to establish rules applicable within their borders not inconsistent
with those set forth by the larger entity. Imagine that the political rules of
the larger entity permit minority coalitions of smaller entities to block leg-
islation. Imagine further that there exist firms with their principal places
of business within the smaller entities. These firms are controlled by man-
agers or shareholders who are also principally located in the smaller enti-
ties where the firms have their legal organization. All firms fall into one of
two categories: potential bidders and potential targets. Bidders and targets
have roughly equal political power. Bidders can attempt to acquire control
over targets located anywhere within the larger entity and, because they are
in the business of acquiring other firms, prefer rules that make takeovers
easier. Targets, who might wish to remain independent, prefer rules that
make takeovers harder. What sort of takeover rules can be expected in this
set-up?
Consider first the rules applicable in the larger entity. These rules
apply to all parties and transactions. In such a case, the interests of bid-
ders and targets are both directly involved, and, since both have roughly
equal resources, they will tend to offset one another. Legislators respond-
ing to lobbying pressures (or campaign contributions) will therefore tend
to adopt rules that do not substantially favor either side, but that do serve
as a means of protecting investors. 3 Thus, takeover regulation in the
broader entity will be reasonably even-handed as between targets and
bidders.
2. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Takeovers: English and American, 6 EUR. FIN.
MGMT. 533 (2000) (discussing the theory on differences between U.S. and U.K. takeover
law upon which this paper expands).
3. However, rules enacted for the ostensible purpose of protecting investors often
have an impact on the cost and likelihood of takeovers. For example, rules requiring
bidders to disclose substantial holdings may reduce the bidders' gains from acquiring a
"toehold" in the target and, therefore, lessen their incentives to launch a bid. See Daniel
R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1, 13 (1978) (arguing that a decision to
tender involves research costs and that a failure to recognize a property right in this
information will decrease the incentives to produce the same); Jonathan R. Macey &
Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 131 (1987)
(arguing that relevant disclosure rules appear to force inefficient wealth transfers from
shareholders of bidding firms to shareholders of target firms). On the other hand, if
shareholders' approval of takeover defenses is required, such defenses will be less likely
and the number of takeovers will be potentially greater. We consider takeover regulation
to be even-handed when its impact is minimized for both bidders and targets. We con-
sider regulation to be target-friendly when its effect is to make hostile acquisitions rela-
tively more expensive or to deter them altogether.
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Now consider the political environment in smaller jurisdictions. Here
the interests of targets remain strong-they prefer local rules that deter
unwanted takeover bids. They know that when and if a hostile bid is made,
it will be subject to the law of their local jurisdiction. Therefore, targets are
likely to expend significant resources lobbying for local rules that increase
the costs of unwanted takeover bids.
However, the interests of bidders do not result in the same level of cam-
paign contributions at the local level. Bidders organized within the local
jurisdiction have an incentive to lobby for bidder-friendly regulation, but
the fact that only some potential targets exist within that jurisdiction
dilutes their incentive. Many potential targets are in other smaller jurisdic-
tions, and the bidder's lobbying within its local jurisdiction will not lead to
a reduction of the costs of acquiring these foreign firms. This means that
bidders organized within a given smaller jurisdiction have much less to
lose if the entity adopts anti-takeover rules because such rules only fore-
close part of their market. Bidders from other smaller jurisdictions do lose
from protective legislation in the smaller entity, but they have little influ-
ence in the political process of the smaller entity and, therefore, little to
gain by making contributions. The result is that rules in smaller entities
can be expected to be more favorable to targets than are rules adopted by
the larger entity. 4 Of course, the larger entity has the authority to enact
preemptive regulations that displace rules adopted by the smaller entities.5
But since minority coalitions of the smaller entities can block legislation at
the level of the larger entity, and since smaller entities generally favor
targets, such preemptive regulations will not be adopted. Instead the larger
entity is likely to adopt neutral framework rules, such as those requiring
publication of takeover bids or public supervision of the same, which can
be adapted by the smaller entities to fit their own individual political
situations.
So far, the model has predicted differences in takeover regulation
between larger and smaller political jurisdictions. What about the differ-
ences between smaller jurisdictions? Here, we expect that the degree of
protection afforded to target firms will be a function of the particular facts
and circumstances in the smaller jurisdiction. If the ratio of targets to bid-
ders varies across smaller entities, we would predict that smaller entities
4. For instance, the requirements for disclosure of substantial holdings will be
more stringent-in the sense that the threshold for disclosure is lower or the delay for
disclosure is shorter-or there will be more room for post-bid defenses. See Marco
Pagano, Fausto Panunzi & Luigi Zingales, Osservazioni sulla Riforma della Disciplina
dell'OPA, degli Obblighi di Comunicazione del Possesso Azionario e dei Limiti agli Incroci
Azionari, 43 RivISTA DELLE SOCIETA 152 (1998) (Italy) (arguing that if the bidder is forced
to disclose its shareholding in the target too soon, its profit will be smaller and control
contestability will be consequently reduced).
5. For example, rules permitting the adoption of multiple-voting shares or other
control-enhancing devices by the targets. See Guido Ferrarini, Share Ownership, Take-
over Law and the Contestability of Corporate Control, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=265429 (arguing that a policy maker has to fix the threshold for shareholdings and the
delay for disclosure by balancing the need for transparency on the one hand and that for
corporate control contestability on the other).
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with many potential targets and few bidders will adopt stronger antitake-
over rules than will smaller entities with fewer targets and more bidders.
Similarly, jurisdictions are likely to authorize a wider range of takeover
defenses when target managers have a special reason to feel vulnerable to
the threat of a hostile acquisition and fewer takeover defenses when target
managers feel relatively protected against hostile bids.
II. The United States
We now consider whether the simple theoretical model presented
above is consistent with the actual pattern of takeover regulation. We start
with an analysis of U.S. rules.
A. Federal Law
In the case of the United States, the model suggests that regulations
adopted at the national level, where both targets and bidders are reasona-
bly equally represented, are likely to be neutral as between the two. 6 This
prediction is consistent with the observed patterns of federal law: both the
Williams Act and federal proxy rules adopt a neutral stance on the topic of
contests for corporate control.7
1. Tender Offers
The federal Williams Act, enacted in 1968, established the basic
ground rules for tender offers in the United States. 8 A key feature of the
Williams Act is the policy of neutrality. 9 Congress attempted to create a
level playing field between targets and bidders by attempting to empower
investors to make decisions without compulsion and on the basis of full
and complete information. 10
The Williams Act contains several important provisions that imple-
ment this policy of creating a level playing field between bidder and target.
First, any party who intends to seek five percent or more of a class of
equity securities by means of a tender offer 1 1 must file a Schedule 14d-1
6. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law
and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REv. 111, 164 (2001) (suggesting that federal law
could correct the pro-target bias of state law).
7. See William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in
the Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 241, 278-79 (1990).
8. See Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1968) (adding new
§§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 [hereinaf-
ter 1934 Act]); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135, 136 n.3 (6th Cir.
1986).
9. See Tyson, supra note 7, at 278.
10. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982) (stating that the Williams Act
was intended to avoid creating an undue advantage for either management or the
bidder).
11. "Tender offer" is not defined in the federal statute but has received definition
through judicial gloss over the years. See EDwARD BRODSKv & M. PATRICIA ADAmsKi, LAw
OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 15:7 (2009).
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statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 1 2 The
Schedule 14d-1 statement must include information on the background of
the bidder, the bidder's source of funds, plans for fundamental corporate
change to the target company, the extent of the bidder's ownership in the
target, past transactions with the target, antitrust problems, and other per-
tinent information. 13 The bidder must communicate information to share-
holders as well as the SEC, and must also provide the target company with
information about the bid.14 The Williams Act imposes similar disclosure
requirements under Schedule 13d on any purchaser who acquires five per-
cent or more of a registered equity security, even prior to the launching of a
tender offer.' 5 Having provided the necessary information; the bidder may
go forward with the bid, leaving the success or failure of the offer up to
market forces.
As implemented by the SEC, the Williams Act contains certain other
protections for shareholders of the target firm. For example, shareholders
are permitted to withdraw their shares as long as the bid remains open.' 6
The bidder must purchase all shares at the same price, even if it increases
the offering price after a shareholder has tendered. 1 7 If the bid is for only
some of the shares and more are tendered, the shares must be purchased
on a pro rata basis. 18 The bidder cannot discriminate among shareholders
by favoring some or excluding others. 19 False or misleading statements or
omissions in connection with a tender offer are prohibited.20 Although
these provisions do limit the ability of bidders to apply pressure on target
shareholders to tender into the bid, they in no way limit the ability of a
bidder to succeed in a hostile acquisition if the offer is made at a fair price
and on an even-handed basis.
Moreover, the Williams Act confers no explicit private right of
action.2 1 The courts, however, have recognized several such rights by
implication. 22 Targets and bidders, as well as shareholders, have standing
to seek injunctive relief to enforce both the statute and implementing regu-
lations. 23 Private rights to sue for damages are somewhat more limited.
Neither an unsuccessful bidder nor the target corporation has a private
right of action for damages under the Act's antifraud provisions. 24 Other
12. See 1934 Act, supra note 8, § 78n(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (2008).
13. 1934 Act, supra note 8, § 78m(d).
14. Id. § 78n(d).
15. Id. § 78m(d) (2008); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2008).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (2008).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (2006).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (2005).
19. 17 CFR. § 240.14d-10(a)(1).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
21. See Brian E. Rosenzweig, Private Versus Public Regulation: A Comparative Analysis
of British and American Takeover Controls, 18 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 213, 227 (2007).
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (recog-
nizing bidder's right to sue for injunctive relief); Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v.
Am. Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (same).
24. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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investors do enjoy private rights of action for damages, both under the stat-
ute itself 25 and under the SEC regulations. 26 However, such rights are not
available across the board;27 the analysis depends on each specific statu-
tory or regulatory provision. 28 Again, the policy of neutrality can be dis-
cerned in the area of private rights of action: some rights are conferred on
both targets and bidders, but the regulations do not create an open season
for lawsuits against bidding firms.
2. Proxy Contests
In addition to tender offers, proxy contests represent another means
for acquiring control of a company. Although state rules govern the sub-
stantive law of proxies, the SEC-under the authority of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934-regulates proxy contests. 2 9 Here again, as in the
case of the Williams Act, the policy of federal law is one of neutrality.30
The SEC's Regulation 14A applies to all persons soliciting proxies, includ-
ing, in the case of proxy contests, both the registrant (the target company)
and the bidder. 3 1
B. State Law
Our model of takeover regulation predicts that takeover rules will be
more target-friendly at the state than at the federal level, since targets
located in individual states have large, undiversified interests in rules pro-
tecting them from hostile acquisitions. As with federal law, the model's
prediction is consistent with the observed pattern of state law.
State authority to act in this area is circumscribed both by the Wil-
liams Act, which courts have held to have broad preemptive force, 'and the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits state actions
that unduly burden interstate commerce. 32 In some cases, consistent with
our theory, federal authorities have nullified state efforts to protect target
25. See, e.g., Pryor v. U.S. Steel Corp., 794 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing a
private right of action under § 14(d)(6) that requires the bidder to purchase the target's
shares on a pro rata basis); In Re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litig.,
467 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (implying right of action under § 14(e) of the stat-
ute, the general anti-fraud provision).
26. For example, target shareholders enjoy private rights of action under Rule 14e-3,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3, which prohibits insider trading in connection with tender offers.
See, e.g., O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); see also All Holders Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a) (requiring equal treatment of
shareholders in takeover bids); Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
27. See, e.g., MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATIONS: LI.BILInES AND REMEDIES
§§ 9.02-03 (2005) (detailing the sections of the SEC rules for which courts have and
have not implied private rights of action).
28. See, e.g., id.
29. See, e.g., 18 Am. JUR. 2D Corporations §§ 902-13 (2009).
30. See Joseph E. Calio & Rafael X. Zahralddin, The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions of Accountability, 14 PACE L. REV. 459, 518
(1994).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (2005).
32. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630 (1982).
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corporations. For example, in Edgar v. MITE Corporation,33 the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute on the grounds that the state
did not have the power, under the U.S. Constitution, to authorize its secre-
tary of state to block nationwide takeover bids for Illinois corporations. In
another case, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a company's attempt to
defend itself against a hostile bid by means of an above-market tender for
its own shares that excluded the bidder from the offer.3 4 The SEC, how-
ever, effectively nullified this decision by enacting preemptive regulation
under the Williams Act prohibiting discrimination in tender offers. 3 5
In other cases, states have found ways to impose limitations on take-
over bids and proxy contests while avoiding federal preemption.36 For
example, notwithstanding the extensive federal regulation of the proxy
rules, states retain the power to determine whether the corporate treasury
will pay the costs of a proxy solicitation. 3 7 Here, consistent with our the-
ory, the pattern favors targets. 38 State rules generally permit the target's
management to use corporate funds to resist takeovers but require the bid-
der to pay the proxy costs upfront, subject to potential reimbursement
(with shareholder approval) in the event the contest is successful. 39
States also use their power to regulate the internal affairs of corpora-
tions to favor targets over bidders.40 State legislatures have drawn on this
power to provide assistance to incumbent managers wishing to fend off
unwanted takeover bids.41 When the Supreme Court ruled that direct reg-
ulation of tender offers would not pass muster,42 state legislatures became
more creative in promulgating regulations.4 3 Control-share statutes are
one example: they apply to shares held by an acquirer that exceed certain
threshold percentages of a company's total shares (such as twenty or
33. Id.
34. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(1) (2006).
36. See Stephen Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-MITE:
The Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DICK. L. REV. 731, 743-50 (1986);
Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover
Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 778 (1988).
37. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests,
1992 Wis. L. REv. 1071, 1078-79 (1992).
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.
1955) (approving expenditures from corporate treasury by old board of directors as well
as corporate reimbursement for expenditures by insurgents which were ratified by share-
holder vote after successful proxy contest).
40. See Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, supra note 37,
at 1073.
41. See generally, Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 6 (tracing the development of state
antitakeover law).
42. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982).
43. See James E. Vallee, Student Article, Beyond Reproach: Management Entrenchment
Through the Texas Business Combination Law, 30 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1283, 1307 (1999);
see also David Porter, Competing with Delaware: Recent Amendments to Ohio's Corporate
Statutes, 40 AKRON L. REv. 175, 185 (2007) (illustrating anti-takeover statutes promul-
gated in Ohio).
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thirty-three percent).1 4 When an acquirer exceeds that threshold, it loses
voting rights in the shares it holds unless the other ("disinterested") share-
holders affirmatively vote to restore the rights.45 Business combination
statutes function in a similar fashion, but do not restrict voting rights; they
simply prohibit a bidder who exceeds the statutory thresholds from com-
mencing a "business combination" with the target corporation for a speci-
fied number of years. 46 Some of these statutes also contain "fair price"
clauses that effectively prevent freeze-out mergers, even at the conclusion of
the moratorium period, unless a majority of the disinterested shareholders
must approve the combination. 4 7 Pennsylvania has gone even further.48 In
addition to an onerous control-share provision, Pennsylvania's statute
allows target companies to force bidders to repay profits on shares they
purchased and sold during the specified period, thus precluding the bid-
der from making any merchant profits during the moratorium period.
49
Target corporations have also effectively harnessed the internal affairs
power to "home-make" takeover defenses structured as ordinary rules of
corporate governance.50 If blessed by the chartering state, these defenses
are generally immune from legal challenge, either under federal law or
under the law of states other than the chartering state. 5 1 A particularly
effective antitakeover device that purports to represent an exercise of cor-
porate internal affairs is the staggered board of directors-a board whose
members serve for multiyear terms and who can be replaced (unless
removed pursuant to the procedures in the charter or bylaws) only when
their term expires. 52 The most common form of staggered board provides
for the election of only one-third of the directors each year. 53 This means
that a bidder generally will have to wait two years before acquiring control
of a company even if it succeeds in acquiring an outright majority of a
company's stock in a tender offer. 5 4 The bidder may, of course, seek to
unseat a director before the expiration of his term, but this may prove diffi-
44. See, e.g., Vallee, supra note 43, at 1307 (noting that controlled shares are
"acquired by outside interests in a series of related acquisitions that result in ownership
above levels specified by the law.").
45. See id.
46. SeeJulian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605,
618 (2007).
47. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1705(3) (2009).
48. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1721, 2561, 2571, 2581 (2008).
49. See id. § 2571.
50. Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34
FLA. ST, U.L. REV. 211, 230-31 (2007).
51. See Pinto, supra note 36, at 723-24.
52. See Rivka Weill, Declassifying the Classified, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 891, 895-96
(2006).
53. The limitation to three classes on the board is due to provisions of the Delaware
Corporation Law, which prohibit more than three classes of directors, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141(d) (2005), as well as the listing requirements of the New York Stock
Exchange, which do the same. NYSE, INc., LiSTED COMPANY MANUAL § 304.00 (2005).
54. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian,
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54
STAN. L. REv. 887, 889 (2002) [hereinafter Staggered Boards].
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cult: removal without cause generally requires a supermajority shareholder
vote, and removal for cause requires proof of some misconduct, which may
be lacking and may result in messy litigation. 55 Staggered boards have
been a feature of Anglo-American corporations for hundreds of years, but
their traditional purpose was to confer continuity in management by
preventing wholesale board turnover.56 The evidence suggests that stag-
gered boards are now frequently used as an antitakeover device.
57
Another management-created antitakeover device, which also derives
its authority from internal affairs principles, is the poison pill. 58 These
instruments, which were created by attorneys at a well-known corporate
law firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, L.L.P., assume a variety of
forms, but all serve the same general function.59 Usually designated by a
less opprobrious name, such as a "rights plan," a poison pill is distributed
to shareholders of a potential target firm-ideally well in advance of any
bidder appearing on the scene. 6 ° The plan purports to give shareholders
rights to purchase the company's shares at a steep discount in the event of
defined events in the corporation, such as any party acquiring more than a
specified percentage of the company's stock without the consent of the tar-
get management.6 1 Bidders, however, do not enjoy similar rights with
respect to shares they have purchased. 6 2 Thus, when and if exercised, the
poison pill has a powerful dilutive effect that makes unfriendly takeovers
financially unacceptable. 63 In practice, pills erect "an impenetrable barrier
to control acquisitions. '64 Although supporters promote poison pills as
conferring a benefit on shareholders, critics argue that their real purpose is
to deter hostile takeovers, thus depriving shareholders of the premium that
they could expect for their shares if a hostile takeover were to succeed. 6 5
In addition to the internal affairs power, states promote takeover
defenses by allowing corporate managers to exercise broad business judg-
55. See David S. Freeman, Shark Repellant Charter and Bylaw Provisions, 16 J. CORP.
L. 491, 500 n.40 (1991).
56. See ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 226 (4th ed.
2008).
57. Staggered Boards, supra note 54, at 889 (finding that the percentage of staggered
boards in publicly traded companies more than doubled between 1990 and 2001,
increasing from 34% to over 70% in that period).
58. One of the authors represented shareholders in Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), the leading Delaware Supreme Court case on poison pills,
but he is too modest to suggest that the outcome-a unanimous rejection of the author's
argument-had anything to do with his skills at oral advocacy.
59. See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, L.L.P., The Share Purchase Rights Plan,
reprinted in RONALDJ. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
AcQuISITIONS 10-18 (2d ed. Supp. 1999).
60. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 274-86 (2000).
61. See id.
62. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1
VA. L. & Bus. REv. 10, 32 (2006).
63. See id.
64. Staggered Boards, supra note 54, at 905.
65. The literature on poison pills is enormous. See generally Coates, supra note 60
(summarizing literature on the poison pill).
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ment to undertake transactions that have the effect of deterring unwanted
takeovers. "Scorched earth" tactics, such as threats to sell off valuable
assets that the bidder desires, were once used and approved under state
law. These have fallen out of fashion-not because they were banned under
state law but because they were more costly than other mechanisms that
were equally effective. 66 One important device widely used today is the
"embedded defense," a contract entered into between the target and a third
party that would impose prohibitive costs on the bidder if the acquisition
succeeds.67 For example, a contract with a purchaser, supplier, or strategic
partner might provide for the payment of a large financial penalty in the
event of a change in control within the target firm. 68
So far, we have described the menu of takeover regulations available
across the states. As a practical matter, however, the most important state
is Delaware, which is the corporate home to a majority of publicly traded
firms. 69 One might suspect that Delaware, with its strong state interest in
attracting corporate charters,70 would be at the forefront of catering to the
managers of companies who seek protection against unwanted bids.71
This, however, is not the case. Delaware does protect targets, but it does
not spread a protective wing over all defensive tactics. Such tactics must be
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'72 Thus, under Delaware law,
the target's board is not obligated to deal with a potential acquirer, 73 but if
it does put the company "in play" it must conduct a fair auction.74 Poison
pills are generally permissible, but their use will be scrutinized and
66. See Shaun J. Mathew, Hostile Takeovers in India: New Prospects, Challenges, and
Regulatory Opportunities, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 800, 828-29 (2007)
67. See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Share-
holder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 582 (2003); see generally Guhan Subramanian, The
Emerging Problem of Embedded Defenses: Lessons from Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International
v. UAL Corp., 120 HAv. L. REV. 1239 (2007).
68. See Subramanian, supra note 67, at 1242.
69. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate,
46 J.L. & EcON. 383 (2003).
70. Delaware obtains a substantial amount of tax revenues from out-of-state firms
that charter in that state. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
LAW 39 (1993).
71. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 469 (1987); Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 225, 280-81
(1985); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L.
REV. 709, 752 (1987).
72. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
73. See, e.g., Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545,
1555 (D. Del. 1995); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43
n.13 (Del. 1994) ("[W]here a potential sale of control by a corporation is not the conse-
quence of a board's action, this Court has recognized the prerogative of a board of direc-
tors to resist a third party's unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer."); Paramount
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990) (noting that the court
has "repeatedly stated that the refusal to entertain an offer may comport with a valid
exercise of a board's business judgment.").
74. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (1990).
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rejected if an obvious purpose is entrenchment. 75 The state's laws treat
pills that insulate the target's management from market pressure in the face
of a hostile bid with suspicion.76 The Delaware business combination stat-
ute7 7 is mild when compared with the laws of some other states: 78 It does
not apply to one-time acquisitions of eighty-five percent or more of the tar-
get's stock, thus permitting tender offers conditioned on very high sub-
scription rates. 79 It also contains an important "competitive bidding"
exception for cases in which the board has approved another bid previ-
ously, thus limiting the target board's ability to sell the company without
conducting a fair auction. 80
How can we explain the pattern in Delaware? The answer, within the
framework of the model presented, is that, because Delaware is home to a
majority of the major American corporations, its field of political forces
includes strong bidder interests. If Delaware adopts strong target protec-
tions, the result will be to place many potential targets out of reach of a
hostile acquisition, not just a few. Bidders have more to lose from such
legislation. At the same time, because so many large firms are incorpo-
rated in Delaware (and others may wish to incorporate there), many bid-
ders will be able to exercise political influence in the state. Because
relatively few potential target firms are located in Delaware, their political
influence is correspondingly lower. We expect, therefore, that Delaware
will adopt intermediate protections for target firms-exactly what is
observed in practice.
III. Europe
We now turn to an analysis of the pattern of takeover regulation in the
European Union (EU).
A. The European Union Directive
Our theory predicts that rules adopted at the EU level will be relatively
neutral between the interests of bidders and targets, because the relative
political power of bidder and target firms will tend to be relatively equal at
this broader geographic level. This prediction is confirmed by the data.
75. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
76. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (rejecting
a poison pill plan that would fundamentally limit the new board's abilities to carry out
their duties for six months-also known as a "dead hand" poison pill-as a violation of
title 8, section 141(a) of the Delaware Code); Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc. 723 A.2d 1180
(Del. Ch. 1998) (rejecting a similar dead hand poison pill as a violation of sections
141(a) and (d)).
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001).
78. Compare 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101 (2008), with Guhan Subramanian, The
Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate
and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2002) (discussing antitakeover
statutes in various states).
79. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203.
80. See id.
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The Takeover Directive, adopted in 2004, after agonizing years of con-
troversy, provides a framework for EU member states to implement take-
over rules. 8 1 In some respects the Directive emulates the U.S. Williams
Act. 82 For example, it requires the following: that bidders announce their
bids as soon as possible and inform the supervisory authorities, 3 that all
holders of securities be treated equally in takeover bids,8 4 that all share-
holders be offered the highest offer price,8 5 that bids remain open long
enough to allow informed decisions by target shareholders,8 6 and that
appropriate disclosures are made so as to ensure the transparency and
integrity of markets. 87 Furthermore, it recommends that supervisory
authorities be empowered to obtain relevant information from bidders,8 8
In three key respects, however, the Directive goes beyond what the Wil-
liams Act deemed necessary to protect shareholders.8 9 One of these
aspects is the mandatory bid rule. 90 Following pre-existing law in most
member states, the Directive instructs member states to require persons
who have acquired control of a company to thereafter "make an offer to all
the holders of that company's securities for all of their holdings at an equi-
table price."9 1 The mandatory bid rule appears to have two principal pur-
poses.92 First, it purports to deny controlling shareholders the power to
sell the private benefits of control to another party. 93 Second, the
mandatory bid rule protects minority shareholders after the takeover by
providing an escape hatch for persons who do not wish to be minority
shareholders of a controlled company. 94 Although some critics might
argue that the mandatory bid rule increases the price of takeovers rather
than effectively protecting minority interests or that it impedes the rede-
ployment of productive assets to more efficient uses, the strategy is popular
in Europe and was adopted widely in member states even before the Direc-
tive.9 5 This requirement parallels the Williams Act rules that all sharehold-
81. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 Oj. (L 142) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Directive]; see
Eddy Wymeersch, The Takeover Bid Directive, Light and Darkness (Financial Law Insti-
tute, Universiteit Gent, Working Paper 2008-01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1086987 (providing an overview of the Directive).
82. In 1968, Congress added sections 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the 1934 Act, col-
lectively known as the Williams Act. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Williams Act).
83. Directive, supra note 81, pmbl., cl. 12, art. 6.
84. Id. art. 3(1)(a).
85. Id. art. 5(4).
86. Id. arts. 3(1)(b), 7.
87. Id. art. 8.
88. Id. pmbl., cl. 15.
89. In addition to these three, the Directive also goes beyond the Williams Act by
requiring member states to allow successful bidders holding at least ninety percent of
the securities to squeeze out minority shareholders for fair compensation and permit-
ting states to increase this threshold to ninety-five percent). Id. art. 5.
90. See Wymeersch, supra note 81, at 5.
91. Directive, supra note 81, pmbl., cl. 9, art. 5(1).
92. See id.
93. See id. arts. 5(1)-(4).
94. See id. art. 5(1).
95. For criticism, see Luca Enriques, The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Takeover Direc-
tive: Harmonization Without Foundation?, 1 EUR. Co. & FIN. L. REv. 440 (2004); Simone
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ers should be treated equally and that all should receive the same price for
tendered shares.9 6 However, it exceeds U.S. law insofar as it requires the
bidder to make an "any and all" offer if it acquires control.9 7 Under U.S.
law, the function of protecting minority shareholders against majority
oppression is principally vested in state corporate law.98 Thus, the Wil-
liams Act does not require bidders to offer for all the shares once they have
acquired control. 99
A second key difference between the rules in Europe and those in the
United States is the Directive's endorsement of board neutrality during
takeover contests.10 0 Earlier drafts of the Directive essentially endorsed the
position taken by U.S. corporate legal scholars Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel that the target's board should remain passive in the face of a
takeover bid and should not engage in any defensive strategies. 1 1 In par-
ticular, the Directive's passivity rule was modeled on the City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers, which allows for post-bid defenses only upon
authorization by the target's general meeting. 10 2 This rule goes beyond
U.S. law, which, as we have seen, offers in some states an extraordinarily
high degree of protection from unwanted takeovers. 0 3 The Directive is not
so protective. 10 4 It requires target boards to act in the best interests of the
company and prohibits them from taking actions that effectively would
deny holders the opportunity to decide the merits of a bid. 10 5 It requires
transparency for defensive tactics and arrangements 10 6 and emphasizes
M. Sepe, Private Sale of Corporate Control: Why the European Mandatory Bid Rule is Ineffi-
cient (Siena Memos and Papers on Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 43, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086321.
96. 15 U.S.C § 78n(d)(7) (2002).
97. See Directive, supra note 81, art. 5(4).
98. See Robert Todd Lang & Robert L. Messineo, Recent Developments in Takeovers
and Pending Proposals for Regulatory Changes, 609 PLI/CoRP 909, 950 (1988).
99. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2002).
100. Although these rules are sometimes described as requiring neutrality or passiv-
ity on the part of the board, this does not appear to be the case: the board can take a
strong position against the takeover bid as long as it only engages in defensive tactics
(other than seeking competing bids) as approved by a general meeting of the sharehold-
ers. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 1, at 199-201.
101. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
102. See Charles M. Nathan, Michael R. Fischer & Samrat Ganguly, An Overview of
Takeover Regimes in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, 1400 PLI/CoRP 943, 1003
(2003).
103. See William Magnuson, Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe: An
Institutional Approach, 21 PACE INT'L L. REv. 205, 205 (2009).
104. See Vanessa Edwards, The Directive on Takeover Bids- Not Worth the Paper It's
Written On?, 1 EUR. Co. & FIN. L. REv. 416, 439 (2004) (concluding that, despite its
failures, the Directive unquestionably improves the position of minority shareholders in
a target company).
105. Directive, supra note 81, art. 3(1)(c).
106. See id. pmbl., cl. 18 ("In order to reinforce the effectiveness of existing provisions
concerning the freedom to deal in the securities of companies ... and the freedom to
exercise voting rights, it is essential that the defensive structures and mechanisms envis-
aged by such companies be transparent and that they be regularly presented in reports
to general meetings of shareholders."), art. 10.
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that member states "should take the necessary measures to afford any [bid-
der] the possibility of acquiring majority interests in other companies and
of fully exercising control of them."'10 7 Most importantly, the Directive
requires the target's board to obtain prior shareholder authorization before
taking any action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may result in
the frustration of the bid.10 8 The Directive particularly disfavors defensive
tactics that involve the issuance of shares that may result in a "lasting
impediment" to the bidder's ability to acquire control over the target. 10 9
The third key difference between U.S. law and the approach found in
the Directive is the latter's use of "breakthrough" rules.1 0 These invalidate
a variety of corporate law strategies that might be used to impede or defeat
takeover bids, such as poison pills or dual-class share structures conferring
control rights on block-holders."' Thus, the Directive provides that
restrictions on the transfer of securities will have no effect if used to resist
takeover bids;1 12 it nullifies limitations on voting rights adopted after the
announcement of the bid;1 13 and it requires that shares with multiple vot-
ing rights carry one vote." 4 The breakthrough rules also limit defensive
tactics that apply after an offer has succeeded. 1 15 Bidders who acquire
seventy-five percent of the shares are entitled to call a general meeting in
which all shares carry one vote per share, the concept being that such a
meeting will allow the bidder to break up remaining control positions. 1 16
These rules are controversial because they preempt prior contractual and
legal arrangements, although their effect is mitigated, to some extent, by
the requirement that "equitable compensation" must be paid to sharehold-
ers whose rights are broken through. 1 17
107. Id. pmbl., cl. 19.
108. Id. art. 9(2).
109. Id. The requirement of shareholder approval is a potentially significant obstacle
to defensive tactics, but its benefits in this respect may be fewer than might be imagined
in the case of companies with highly concentrated share ownership. Because interested
shareholders generally can vote in favor of their economic interests, and because the
remainder of the shareholders are often rationally ignorant, the entrenched group might
be able to prevail at the shareholders' meeting even when the tactic being proposed is
not in the best interest of the public shareholders. In these contexts, it can be antici-
pated that defensive tactics will take the form of initiatives needing approval by only a
majority vote rather than ones that typically require supermajority approval, such as the
issuance of new shares.
110. See Magnuson, supra note 103, at 221-22.
111. See Directive, supra note 81, pmbl., cl. 19, art. 11 ("breakthrough" rules). For
discussion of these important rules, see Guido Ferrarini, One Share-One Vote: A European
Rule?, 3 EUR. Co. & FIN. L. REV. 147 (2006) [hereinafter One Share-One Vote].
112. See, e.g., Magnuson, supra note 103, at 221-22.
113. See, e.g., id.
114. See, e.g., id.
115. See Directive, supra note 81, art. 11(4) (lifting restrictions on transfer once an
offeror acquires seventy-five percent of a company's voting capital).
116. See id.
117. See id. art. 11(2) (stating that "contractual agreements" do not apply);
Magnuson, supra note 103, at 221-22 (describing the breakthrough rule as "[o]ne of the
more controversial... provisions of the directive"). The effect of the breakthrough rules
is mitigated, to some extent, by the requirement that "equitable compensation" be paid
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The board neutrality and breakthrough rules, if implemented,
represent a strong endorsement of the value of a free and open market for
corporate control. Even more than the Williams Act, they seek to create a
level playing field where market forces, rather than political or legal power
of incumbent managers, will determine the outcome of a takeover con-
test.1 18 However, in a bow to countries that resisted strong limitations on
defensive tactics, the Directive permits member states to opt out of both the
breakthrough prohibitions on defensive tactics and the requirement of
shareholder approval for defensive tactics, though individual companies
can opt back in, and if they do, their member state may allow them to opt
out again if their counterparty is not bound by the rules. 1 19 Further, the
Directive contains a reciprocity feature, under which a member state may
decide whether to relax or waive the prohibitions or restrictions of the
breakthrough and board neutrality rules in the event of a takeover bid by a
company that is not subject to such rules. 1 20 This complex structure of
opt-out and opt-in rights obviously reduces the efficacy of the Directive at
harmonizing takeover regulation at the EU level,1 2 1 and, to some, effec-
tively converts a system of mandatory rules into a series of
"recommendations." 1 2 2
Overall, the Takeover Directive can be understood as creating a rela-
tively level playing field between bidders and targets. The provisions of the
Directive regulating the details of bids-such as disclosure, timing and
related matters-apply in an even-handed manner.123 The board neutrality
and breakthrough rules are also intended to create a level playing field
between target and bidder, so that the offer's success or failure will depend
on its intrinsic merit as judged by the testimony of the marketplace. 12 4 In
some respects the Takeover Directive is even more protective of bidders
than the United States' Williams Act. However, this may be explained by
differing political dynamics in the two areas, including the fact that a
minority of states may have greater power to block legislation in the United
States due to the equal representation of states in the Senate, regardless of
population, and the filibuster rule that requires a supermajority vote to
defeat a determined minority block.
to shareholders whose rights are broken through. See Directive, supra note 81, art.
11(5).
118. See, e.g., Dmitry Tuchinsky, The Takeover Directive and Inspire Art: Reevaluating
the European Union's Market for Corporate Control in the New Millennium, 51 N.YL. SCH.
L. REv. 689, 691 (2007).
119. Directive, supra note 81, pmbl., cl. (21), art. 12(1), art. 12(3).
120. Id. art. 12(3).
121. See generally Matteo Gatti, Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the Euro-
pean Takeover Directive, 6 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 553 (2005) (cautiously endorsing opt-
out rules but critiquing reciprocity provisions).
122. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 1, at 211 ("The irony of this supposed harmonization
is that, as to two of the three features, the supposed imposition of the new law by the
European legislature is really a recommendation.").
123. See Directive, supra note 81, arts. 7-8.
124. Id., arts. 9, 11.
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Evenhandedness cannot be expected within the EU with respect to
potential bids by parties not represented in the EU political process. We
expect, therefore, that the rules adopted at the EU level would provide ave-
nues for protection against hostile bids from outside the EU. As a practical
matter, that means the United States. The Directive, consistent with the-
ory, allows member states to protect their firms against takeovers from the
United States by adopting reciprocity rules, which would remove the board
neutrality and breakthrough rules when the bidding firm is chartered in
the United States.125
The EU could, of course, have preempted the use of target-friendly
rules at the member state level. 12 6 However, we posited in the model that a
coalition of smaller entities could block legislation at the larger entity level.
This is exactly what happened with the Takeover Directive, which origi-
nally would have imposed significant protections for bidders on member
states, but which was blocked due to vehement opposition from a coalition
of countries that wished to provide greater protections for potential targets
doing business within their jurisdictions. 12 7 Opposition came from coun-
tries defending the use of multiple voting shares or double-voting "loyalty"
shares as control enhancing mechanisms. 1 28 Other countries, in turn,
rejected board neutrality as excessively weakening the competitive position
of companies already subject to domestic breakthrough rules, such as those
forbidding multiple voting shares and voting caps in Germany. 1 29 In the
end, both European rules became optional for member states. 1 30 However,
the Directive intentionally made it difficult for member states to avoid these
rules by requiring that they affirmatively enact legislation to opt out of the
125. Id., art. 12(3).
126. Catherine E. Halliday-Roberts, Building a Common Frontier or Deconstructing
National Identity? An Analysis of the Effort to Centralize Control of Third Country Immigra-
tion in the European Union, 9 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMP. L. 501, 519 (2002).
127. See John W. Cioffi, The Collapse of the European Union Directive on Corporate
Takeovers: The EU, National Politics, and the Limits of Integration 7 (The Berkeley
Roundtable on the Int'l Econ., Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://brie.berkeley.edu/pub-
lications/John%20Cioffi's%20paper.pdf.
128. According to a recent study, multiple voting rights shares are the most common
type of control enhancing mechanism used in Denmark (5 out of 20 large capitalization
companies that were examined adopted them), Finland (8 of 20), the Netherlands (10 of
19), and Sweden (16 of 20). INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, SHEARMAN & STER-
LING, L.L.P., & EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, REPORT ON THE PROPORTION-
ALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 119, 121, 133, 137 (2007), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/internal market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final-reporten.pdf
[hereinafter PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE]. Blockholder CEMs, such as double-voting
shares, are the most common in France, with 23 occurrences in a 40-company sample
(11 of 20 large caps adopted them). Id. at 44-45.
129. See Klaus Hopt, La 136me Directive sur les OPA-OPE et le Droit Allemand, in
ASPECTS ACTUELS DU DROIT DES AFFAiREs: MfLANGES EN L'HONNEUR D'YVEs GUYON 529
(Dalloz 2003) (Fr.); Rolf Skog, The Takeover Directive - an Endless Saga?, 13 EUR. Bus. L.
REv. 301 (2002); Tyler Theobald, Hostile Takeovers and Hostile Defenses: A Comparative
Look at U.S. Board Deference and the European Effort at Harmonization, 15 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J., Winter 2006, at 60, 71 (2006).
130. Directive, supra note 81, art. 12.
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provisions, rather than allowing them to opt in if they wished to be subject
to them. 13 1
B. Implementation in Member States
So far we have outlined the provisions of the Takeover Directive, a pol-
icy adopted at the level of the European Union. That policy is not self-
implementing; it must be embodied in legislation and regulation by the
member states. Moreover, as noted above, member states have the power to
nullify both the breakthrough and board neutrality rules, either categori-
cally (by opting out of the rules) or on a case-by-case basis (if the bidder is
not subject to similar rules). 132 Accordingly, much depends, in practical
terms, on the implementation of the Directive in the member states. This
issue is analogous, at the European level, to the pattern of state regulation
of takeovers discussed above for the United States.
Our theory predicts that member state implementation of the Take-
over Directive will be skewed in favor of targets because in any given mem-
ber state the political power of potential targets will be significantly greater
than the power of potential bidders. We also anticipate that, as among
member states, the stringency of antitakeover protections will be a function
of the ratio of target-to-bidder political power, which may vary from state to
state. These predictions are consistent with the pattern of implementation
among major member states.
1. France
The French approach to the Takeover Directive grew out of the Lepetit
Report,133 an official advisory committee study chartered by the govern-
ment to recommend how France should implement the new rules.13 4 The
Lepetit Report recommended the board neutrality rule as a corporate gov-
ernance measure close to what was already the law in France, subject, how-
ever, to reciprocity. 13 5 It endorsed reciprocity as a way to establish a level
playing field between domestic and foreign companies. 136 The Report
argued that companies subject to neutrality would be put at a disadvantage
with respect to those not applying it, creating the risk that fewer companies
would place their headquarters in France. 13 7 The Report recommended
that France reject the breakthrough rule with respect to the time when the
bid is pending, on the ground that its limitation of contractual freedom
was not justified by the results achieved. 138 The Report instead floated the
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. JEAN-FRANC.ois LEPETIT, RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR LA TRANSPOSITION DE
LA DIREcrIvE CONCERNANT LES OFFRES PUBLIQUES D'AcQuISITION (2005) (Fr.). As to the
previous provisions of French law on defensive measures, see ALAIN VIANDIER, OPA, OPE
ET AuTREs OFFRES PUBLIQUES (2d ed. 1999).
134. LEPETIT, supra note 133, at 3.
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 15-16.
138. Id. at 10-11.
Cornell International Law Journal
idea of increasing the flexibility and transparency of shareholder agree-
ments and recommended a breakthrough provision invalidating voting
caps after a successful bid is completed, which was in line with the prior
practice of the French financial markets regulator, the Commission des
Operations de Bourse or COB (now Authorite de Marches Financiers or
AMF). 13 9
The French Parliament implemented the Takeover Directive at the end
of March 2006, foreseeing a broad delegation of powers to the AMF. 140
The French Code de Commerce now includes a board neutrality obliga-
tion,1 41 subject, however, to reciprocity.' 4 2 Target companies are exempt
from this obligation if either the bidder or the bidder's controlling entity
are not subject to a similar obligation. 14 3 If several companies launch a
bid, the French target company may invoke reciprocity if even one of them
is not subject to board neutrality. 144 When reciprocity applies in the case
of a takeover bid, however, any measure taken by the board must have been
expressly authorized by the general meeting of shareholders no more than
eighteen months before the launch of the offer in question. 145 This provi-
sion smoothes the impact of reciprocity and decreases the room for board
entrenchment, keeping the shareholders involved in any determination
concerning defensive measures. 146
Furthermore, the new law entitles French companies to issue warrants
for the preferred subscription of shares in the target (bons de souscription
d'actions or BSAs), thus enhancing the possibility for these companies to
resist takeover attempts. 14 7 BSAs are issued upon a resolution of the
139. Id.; see also AUTORIt DES MARCHES FINANCIERS, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMF AND
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS IN 2004, available at http://www.amf-france.org/documents/
general/6394 1.pdf (providing an overview of the AMF).
140. As a result, the AMF Regulation on takeovers was amended on September 18,
2006. See Decree of Sept. 18, 2006 approving amendments to the General Regulation of
the AMF, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Frangaise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France],
September 28, 2006.
141. See C. COM. art. L233-32, para. 2 (stating that, as long a public offer is pending
with respect to a company the shares of which are admitted to negotiations on a regu-
lated market, the board of directors, the supervisory board with the exception of its
power to appoint executives, the management board, the general manager, or one of the
delegated general managers of the target must obtain the preliminary approval of the
general assembly in order to adopt any measure the execution of which could frustrate
the offer, save for the search of other offers). See also id., para. 3 (stating that the general
assembly. must approve or confirm any decision of the above-mentioned persons if made
before the offer period and if it has not been totally or partially executed, is not in the
company's ordinary course of business, and could frustrate the offer).
142. See id. art. L233-33.
143. See id. art. L233-32.
144. See id. art. L233-33, para. 1.
145. See id. para. 2.
146. See id.
147. See id. art. L233-32, para. 2. According to Mr. Lepetit, the BSAs are amongst the
means that can be used in the context of the reciprocity contemplated by the Takeover
Directive. Bruno Segre & Christophe Tricaud, La "Pilule Empoisonnee" de Breton
Examinee par les Deputts, LA TRIBUNE (Fr.), March 6, 2006, at 23.
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extraordinary general meeting 148 and are freely distributed to all share-
holders at the time of the bid's closing. 1 49 A prior general meeting's dele-
gation to the board for the issuance of BSAs is valid only if reciprocity
applies, for example if the bidder is not subject to board neutrality (e.g., a
U.S. bidder), provided that the resolution was made no more than eighteen
months before. 15 0 Otherwise, board neutrality applies and a general meet-
ing's resolution is required after the bid's launch. 15 1 BSAs expire after ter-
mination of the bid or competing offers. 152
BSAs functionally are similar to poison pills in the United States: by
according preferential treatment to existing shareholders, BSAs dilute the
target's share capital and can be used as a negotiating tool with the bid-
der.'5 3 However, they are procedurally different from poison pills. 15 4
While the latter are adopted by the target's board of directors, BSAs cannot
be issued without the target shareholders' authorization in a general
meeting.15 5
French law also adopted the so-called "Danone Amendment," as a
result of rumors that PepsiCo, the diversified U.S. food service company,
was about to launch a takeover bid for Danone, the French yogurt
maker.' 5 6 Under this provision, the AMF can require potential bidders to
disclose their plans to the AMF and the public.' 5 7 Some commentators
praised this provision for enhancing disclosure. 158 However, the AMF's
power to ask for information about confidential plans of potential bidders
can also abort these plans if they are premature and cannot stand the light
of publicity. Moreover, AMF can bar a takeover bid if the bidder has
148. See C. COM. art. L233-32. However, the rules of ordinary general meetings apply
as to the majorities required for the meeting's validity and voting. See id. art. L255-96.
149. See id. art. L233-32, para 2. BSAs are also assigned to the bidder in proportion
to the shares already owned by the same. See Christophe Clerc, Les Bons d'Offre au
Coeur de la Transposition de la Directive OPA, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 27
(2006), at 32.
150. See id. art. L233-32.
151. See id. para. 3.
152. Id. para. 2 (authorizing the target company to wait until the last day of the offer
to make public its intention to issue the warrants).
153. Before the recent reform introducing BSAs, the AMF was opposed to any mecha-
nism used by the target company unilaterally to increase the price of an offer, directly or
indirectly. See AMF, Communique de Presse, April 23, 2004, available at http://www.
amf-france.org/documents/general/5345-I.pdf, referred to by Christophe Clerc, supra
note 149, at 27; Daniel Ohl, Les Bons d'Offre: la Fin des OPA Hostiles?, 5 BULLETIN JOLY
BOURSE 527 (2006); and Pierre Henri Conac Les Bons de Souscription d'Actions 'Plavix' et
les Principes Generaux des Offres Publiques, 2 REV. Soc. 321 (2005).
154. See Babatunde M. Animashaun, Poison Pill: Corporate Antitakeover Defensive Plan
and the Directors' Responsibilities in Responding to Takeover Bids, 18 S.U. L. REV. 171, 194
(1991).
155. See Christophe Clerc, supra note 149 ; Pierre Henri Conac, supra note 153.
156. C. MONETARE ET FINANCIER art. L433-1, para. V; see also Youssef Djehane, Inter-
national Mergers & Acquisitions, 40 INT'L LAW. 311, 31819 (2006).
157. AMF, REGLEMENT GENERAL DE ['AUTORITE DES MARCHES FINANCIERS, art. 223-32.
158. See, e.g., Isabelle Urbain-Parleani, The Implementation of the Thirteenth Directive
2004/25: Country Report on France, in DIE UMSETZUNG DER UBERNAHMERICHITLINIE IN
EUROPA 3, 18-19 (Theodor Baums & Andreas Cahn eds., 2006).
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denied an attempt to acquire the target within the past six months.' 5 9
France opted out of the European breakthrough rule, while leaving
companies free to opt in.160 If a company opts back in to the breakthrough
rules, it cannot avoid complying with these rules on reciprocity grounds,
such as on the ground that the bidder is not subject to breakthrough rules
in its home jurisdiction. 16 ' France did adopt a limited breakthrough rule
as to voting caps-clauses of the charter limiting the voting rights to a
stated percentage of the share capital, such as five per cent-which are
allowed in principle provided that they refer to all shares other than prefer-
ential non-voting shares. 162 In the case of a takeover bid, voting caps are
suspended from the date of the first general meeting after closure of the
bid, and shareholders do not encounter limits to their voting rights pro-
vided that the bidder, either alone or in concert, owns a fraction of the
target's capital higher than the threshold that AMF fixes. 163 Also, any
share transfer restrictions in the articles of association of a listed company
are subject to a limited breakthrough rule: they cannot be used to restrict
the transfer of shares tendered to the bidder in a takeover bid. 164 However,
other pre-bid defenses common in French corporate practice, such as
double-voting shares and shareholders' agreements, 165 were left untouched
in the Directive's implementation. 166 All this is consistent with the French
Government protecting large corporations-so called "national champi-
ons"-under the theory, frequently invoked by politicians, of patriotisme
6conomique.1
6 7
159. AMF, supra note 157, art. 223-35.
160. See THOMAS SCHURRLE ET AL., THE EUROPEAN TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE: STATUS OF IMPLE-
MENTATION 6 (2006), available at http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/ac744
779-09e1-448c-aa35-003adbl 17040/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b18d9b78-ab
24-4a08-ab8c-075baffa25c1/EuropeanTakeoverDirective.pdf.
161. See id.
162. C. COM. art. L225-125 (stating that the charter can limit the number of votes that
each shareholder is entitled to exercise in a general meeting, provided that this limita-
tion applies to all shares, with the exception of preferential non-voting shares).
163. Id.
164. Id. art. L233-34.
165. See PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE, supra note 128, at 44 (stating that the most com-
mon control enhancing mechanisms (CMEs) in France consist of "blockholder CEMs,
such as granting double voting rights to long-term registered shareholders, with 23
occurrences in a 40-company sample, or pyramids, which have been identified in seven
companies"). Also, shareholder agreements are common in large companies and newly
listed ones. Id. at 46.
166. Under French Law, double voting rights may only be attributed to shares, also
known as "loyalty shares." Id. at 18. Loyalty shares must "have been registered in the
name of a shareholder for a specific duration of time set in the company's bylaws (such
duration may not be less than two years)." Id. These shares are not a specific class of
shares, rather "the double-voting right is considered a reward for the long-term commit-
ment of the shareholder." Id.
167. For example, recently the defense against a possible foreign takeover of Suez, a
listed company with disperse shareholders, was brokered by the French Government
sponsoring a merger with Gaz de France, another listed company controlled by the State.
See Peggy Hollinger, A French Energy Champion is Born, FIN. TIMES, July 16, 2008
("Launched by the French government in February 2006 to thwart a hostile bid for Suez
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2. Germany
Germany implemented the European Directive in July 2006.168 The
relevant statute opted out of both the board neutrality and the break-
through rules. 1 6 9 As a result, German companies that are listed are subject
to the lighter regime of takeover defenses that were originally included in
the German Law on Takeovers (WpUG),1 7 0 unless they decide to opt into
the European regime. 17 I Even if a company does opt into the board neu-
trality or breakthrough rules, reciprocity applies if there is a general meet-
ing resolution to this effect. 1 72 Thus, such companies could still resist
takeovers by means that would otherwise violate the rules if the bidder is
not subject to these rules in its home jurisdiction.
The WpUG's treatment of post-bid defenses reflects the two-tiered
structure of German corporate governance: the managing board is allowed
to take defensive measures only upon approval by the supervisory
board. 173 Jeffrey Gordon has described this solution as a backlash follow-
ing Vodafone's successful bid for Mannesmann. 174 Indeed, the German
government, which had supported the first drafts of the European Takeover
Directive, switched positions and opposed the final ones after Mannes-
mann's takeover. 175 The WpUG regime of post-bid defenses was officially
motivated by reference to the notion of a "transatlantic level playing
from Enel of Italy, the deal has drawn both domestic and foreign attacks over the state's
role.").
168. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2004/25/EG des Europaischen Parlaments
und des Rates vom 21. April 2004 betreffend Obernahmeangebote [Law Implementing
European Union Takeover Directive], July 8, 2006, BGBI. 1 2006 at 1426.
169. See SCHORRLE ET AL, supra note 160, at 4.
170. The German Law on Takeovers, WpUG, was first adopted in 2001 to introduce a
mandatory legal framework for the bid-making process. See Wertpapiererwerbs- und
Obernahmegesetz [German Law for Takeovers] Dec. 20, 2001, BGBI. 1,2001 at 3822
[hereinafter WpUG].
171. The opt-in procedure (foreseen by § 33(1) of the WpUG for the neutrality rule
and § 33(2) for the breakthrough rule) requires an amendment of the articles of associa-
tion under § 175 of the German Stock Corporation Act, Aktiengesetz (AktG), for which
an approval of 75% of the share capital represented in the general meeting is required.
Id. § 33(2); Aktiengesetz [AktG] [German Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl. I
at 1089, last amended by Gesetz, July 31, 2009, BGB1. 12009 at 2509 [hereinafter AktG].
172. See WpUG, supra note 170, § 33(2) (requiring the general meeting's simple
majority: the relevant authorization will expire after 18 months). The resolution shall be
communicated to the supervisory authority of the Member State in which the company
has its registered office and to all the supervisory authorities of Member States in which
its securities are admitted to trading on regulated markets or where such admission has
been requested. The authorization shall be published on the target company's web page.
See id. § 33c(3).
173. Id. § 33(l)-(2).
174. Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws in the EU: The
German Example, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 542 (Guido Fer-
rarini, Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2004); see also Martin
H6pner & Gregory Jackson, An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannes-
mann Takeover and German Corporate Governance 27 (Max-Planck-Institut fir Gesell-
schaftsforschung, Discussion Paper 01/4, 2001), available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/
mpifgdp/dp01-4.pdf.
175. See, e.g., CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS 80 (2008).
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field,"'176 with the argument that the U.S. approach, which allows for a
wide discretion of the board as to defensive measures without completely
inhibiting takeovers, should also be valid for Europe. 17 7 However, other
economic and social features of the German system contributed to the
board neutrality rule's rejection, despite recent changes to German corpo-
rate law 178 going in the direction of an "outsider" system, which is charac-
terized by dispersed ownership and an active market in corporate
control. 1 79 German firms' fear of takeovers from foreign firms fired the
push to preserve takeover defenses, even though "economic patriotism"
does not always prevail in Germany. 18 0 Similarly, the principle of
codetermination, which assigns to employees and their unions half of the
supervisory board seats, 18 1 would have been undermined by the neutrality
rule's empowering shareholders to authorize defensive measures. Thus,
trade unions and incumbent managers shared an interest in opposing rules
that made hostile takeovers easier to accomplish.
The German rejection of the European passivity rule stands, to some
extent, in opposition to the relatively broad German acceptance of the one
share-one vote approach that developed long before the Takeover Directive's
implementation. 182 On the one hand, German Corporations Law has long
since banned the use of multiple voting shares-shares conferring more
than one voting right and, therefore, permitting a holder to control a corpo-
176. Gordon, supra note 174, at 545.
177. However, U.S. defensive measures are finally a means through which "the target
board can negotiate a higher price for shareholders," whereas in the German context
they represent a barrier for control change. See id. at 547.
178. See Eric Nowak, Investor Protection and Capital Market Regulation in Germany, in
THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 425, 441 (Jan P. Krahnen & Reinhard H. Schmidt eds.,
2004) (discussing German corporate law modernization).
179. See id.; Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Ownership and Control of German Corpo-
rations, 14 REV. FINANG. STUD. 943 (2007); see also Tim Jenkinson & Alexander
Ljungqvist, The Role of Hostile Stakes in German Corporate Governance, 7 J. CORP. FIN.
397 (2001) (concerning takeovers in particular).
180. Since the 1990s, control of German companies often was acquired by foreign
firms. SeeJenkinson, supra note 179, at 414. In the Mannesmann case, nationalism did
not prevail. See H6pner & Jackson, supra note 174, at 35. Moreover, in 2005, a merger
occurred between Italian Unicredit and German HypoVereins Bank to create a true Euro-
pean banking group. See, e.g., Unicredit Steals a March on the Competition, THE BANKER,
August 1, 2005. But see Klaus Hopt, Obstacles to Corporate Restructuring: Observations
from a European and German Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION, 373 (Michael Tison et al. eds, 2009) (arguing that the situation in Germany
is no better than in other countries, as proven by the Risk Limitation Act of 2008, which
stipulates inter alia new disclosure obligations for investors holding ten percent or more
of the voting rights in a company and was influenced by similar provisions in the United
States and France).
181. Among German scholars the view is still widely held that, under § 93(1) of the
AktG, management should act not only in the shareholders' interest, but also in the
"interest of the enterprise." See Oliver Rieckers & Gerald Spindler, Corporate Govern-
ance: Legal Aspects, in THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 178, at 350, 363. But
see Reinhard H. Schmidt, Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective, in
THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 178, at 386, 393, 406 (providing a critical
view).
182. See AktG, supra note 171, § 12.
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ration with less than a majority of the share capital. 18 3 On the other hand,
the Control and Transparency Act of 1998 forbade listed companies from
using voting caps-clauses of a company's charter limiting the voting rights
of shareholders, generally to a stated percentage of the share capital.1 84
Consequently, takeovers like that of Mannesmann by Vodafone were made
easier, as voting caps were voided by the new law.185 However, listed com-
panies can still include restrictions on voting rights either in shareholder
agreements or in charters by assigning the right to appoint supervisory
board members to individual shareholders or shares. 186 Also, share trans-
fer restrictions are permitted under § 68(2) of the AktG, which allows com-
panies to issue registered shares transferable only upon the corporation's
approval. 18 7 In addition, listed companies tolerate and widely employ
cross-shareholdings-reciprocal holdings of two or more corporations, cre-
ating strong ties between the same and often reinforced by cross-director-
ships' 8 8 -making German transition to a dispersed ownership structure
more difficult to the extent that they perpetrate controlling coalitions. 18 9
3. Italy
Italy implemented the Takeover Directive in three steps, the first,
under the Prodi government, making both the neutrality and breakthrough
183. Id.
184. See Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich [KonTrag]
[Control and Transparency Act] Apr. 27, 1998, BGB1. I at 786 (amending § 12 of the
AktG); Ferrarini, One Share-One Vote, supra note (providing a comparative perspective).
185. See, e.g., John W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and
the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany, 7 GERMAN LJ.
533, 553-55 (2006).
186. See AktG, supra note 171, § 101(2) (providing that shares attributing appoint-
ment rights must in their holders' name, while their transfer requires the company's
approval). On the role..of these shares in takeover defences, see Peter 0. Mblhert,
Umsetzungsfragen der Ubernahmerichtlinie-erheblicher Anderungsbedarf bei den heutigen
Vorschriften des WpUG, 2004 NEUE ZEITSCHR1FT FOR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (F.R.G.) 636,
639 (2004).
187. These shares (vinkulierte Namensaktien) mainly are issued by insurance compa-
nies. The management board must approve their transfer, unless the articles of associa-
tion empower either the supervisory board or the general meeting to the same effect. See
Walter Bayer, Comment to § 68, in MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ 410
(Bruno Kropff &Johannes Semler eds., 2003). As to the impact of the breakthrough rule
when adopted by German companies, see Stephan Harbarth, Europdische Durch-
brechungsregel im deutschen libernahmerecht, 2007 ZEITSCHR1FT FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UN
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 37 (2007) (F.R.G).
188. On cross-holdings, see AktG, supra note 171, § 19(1) (providing that two compa-
nies are "reciprocally participated" if each owns more than a quarter of the other). In
the case of a cross-holding, a voting restriction applies to the company that last exceeded
the 25% threshold. Id. § 328(1). If the cross-holding relates to a listed company, the
relevant shares are not allowed to. vote in the general meeting for the supervisory board
election. Id. § 328(3). Cross-holdings were recently used as an antitakeover device by
Commerzbank. Frank A. Schmid & Mark Wahrenburg, Mergers and Acquisitions in Ger-
many: Social Setting and Regulatory Framework, in THE GERMAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra
note 178, at 261, 282.
189. See Cioffi, supra note 185, at 540-41.
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rules mandatory for all listed companies; 190 the second, under the Berlus-
coni government, reversing in favor of pure optionality-wherein the rules
only apply if the companies opt into their effect.19 1 This reversal was offi-
cially motivated by the current financial crisis and the need to protect cor-
porations from takeovers. 19 2 The third step, made recently by the same
government, reintroduced board neutrality as a default rule, the application
of which listed companies can exclude in their charter. 1 9 3
The first statute adopted for the Directive's implementation embodied
a strong norm of board neutrality. 194 Article 104 of the Consolidated
Financial Services Act (CFSA) already prohibited managers from undertak-
ing actions that might frustrate the bid, other than the mere search for
other bids, unless duly authorized by a resolution of an ordinary or
extraordinary shareholders' meeting. 1 95  This provision tracked the
London City Code, save for a lack of clarity as to the point in time from
which the neutrality rule should apply. 1 96 The revised Article 104 fol-
lowed the Directive by specifying that the rule applied from the time that
the takeover bid was communicated to the Italian Securities Commission,
Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Bora (CONSOB), to when the bid
was completed or expired.1 9 7
The first statute also included the European breakthrough rule. 19 8
This was not a radical departure from the law already in force, which either
prohibited or rigorously limited the use of pre-bid defenses like multiple
voting shares, 19 9 voting caps,20 0 non-voting shares, 2 0 1 and share-transfer
190. CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON, L.L.P., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAKEOVER
DIRECTIVE IN ITALY 1-3 (2008), http://www.cgsh.com/news/newsdetail.aspx?news=224.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See Decree-Law No. 146, art. 1(3), Sept. 25, 2009, Gazz. Uff. No. 246, Oct. 10,
2009.
194. Attuazione della direttiva 2004/25/CE concernente le offerte pubbliche di
acquisto [Implementation of the Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids], Decree-Law
No. 229, Nov. 19, 2007, Gazz. Uff. No. 289, Dec. 13, 2007 (amending the Consolidated
Financial Services Act, Decree-Law No. 58, Feb. 24, 1998, Gazz. Uff. No. 71, Mar. 26,
1998 [hereinafter CFSA]).
195. CFSA, supra note 194, art. 104(1).
196. See infra Part III.B.5 (discussing the London City Code). See Guido Ferrarini,
Implementing the European Takeover Directive in Italy: Requirements and Options, in DIE
UMSETZUNG DER UBERNAHMERICHTLINIE IN EUROPA, supra note 158, at 101, 106 ("In [CON-
SOB]'s opinion, the relevant time is when the offer is first communicated to the market.
However, in the case of INA v. Generali, both the TAR Lazio and the Consiglio di Stato
(affirming the first instance judgment) held that the passivity rule only applied to the
board of the target when an offer is pending, i.e., after a formal communication of the
intention to launch a bid and delivery of the relevant 'offer document' had been made to
[CONSOB] under Article 102(1). As some time could elapse between the date when the
bid is made known to the public and the date when a formal communication is sent to
[CONSOB], the target board may have sufficient time to adopt defensive measures before
being subject to the neutrality rule. This solution is clearly unsatisfactory and could
frustrate the neutrality rule.").
197. CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON, supra note 190, at 2.
198. CFSA, supra note 194, art. 104-a.
199. Multiple voting shares have been forbidden in Italy for more than sixty years. See
CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 2351(4) (Italy).
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restrictions. 20 2 Moreover, a "mini-breakthrough rule" was also in force
with respect to shareholder agreements, under which shareholders were
entitled to back out of voting pacts, blocking agreements, and similar
arrangements when a takeover bid for at least sixty percent of the votes
were in place.20 3 Withdrawal from the relevant agreements was rendered
ineffective if the share transfer to the bidder does not take place, such as if
the bid does not go through.20 4 Parties to shareholder agreements exer-
cised this right several times, allowing takeover bids to be completed
successfully.
20 5
Under new Article 104-bis, limitations on the transfer of securities
during the takeover bid period, as envisaged in the articles of association,
had no effect on the bidder.20 6 Likewise, in cases where a shareholders'
meeting was called under Article 10, limitations on voting rights envisaged
in the articles or shareholders' agreement had no force or effect on the
bidder.20 7 If the bidder acquired seventy-five percent of the voting shares,
limitations on voting rights did not apply at a shareholders' meeting fol-
lowing the close of the bid called to amend the articles or remove or replace
directors.20 8 The first statute also included reciprocity rules as permitted
under the Directive; under section 104-3, the board neutrality and break-
200. Voting caps are forbidden for listed companies, C.c. art. 2351(3), with the excep-
tion of formerly State-owned companies, for which voting caps are allowed by the 1994
Privatizations Law if the company's charter still includes such rights although it is now
publicly traded. The Italian Government appears to believe that the relevant provisions
of the Privatizations Law still have force as lex specialis with respect to the voting caps'
prohibition included in the Civil Code.
201. The issuance of non-voting shares is permitted for stock corporations in general.
See C.c. art. 2351(2). However, in the case of listed companies, non-voting shares must
be issued as "savings shares" (azioni di risparmio) and are subject to the relevant CFSA
provisions, including the requirement that they confer preferential rights to sharehold-
ers. Limited voting shares are also allowed, such as (a) shares with voting rights limited
to the extraordinary general meeting (these shares usually confer preferential rights to
their holders), (b) shares with voting rights limited to the appointment of directors, and
(c) shares with voting rights subject to the occurrence of specific conditions, including
the launch of a takeover bid (provided that the triggering of voting rights is subject to the
shareholders' approval required for defensive measures). The sum of non-voting and
limited voting shares must not exceed half of the legal capital.
202. Clauses requiring board approval of share transfers are generally permitted. See
C.c. art. 2355-bis(2) (stating conditions for the validity of similar clauses). However,
their non-inclusion in a company's charter is a condition for the listing of shares (which
must be freely transferable) at the Italian Exchange. Moreover, third party approval of
share transfers is permitted also for listed companies when required by law, as in the
case of "golden shares" included in the charters of formerly State-owned companies.
203. See CFSA, supra note 194, art. 123(3).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Id. art. 104-bis(2).
207. Id.
208. Id. art. 104-bis(3). However, non-voting shares issued by listed companies as
"saving shares" carry preferential rights, so that the "breakthrough rule" does not apply
to them. See Directive, supra note 81, art. 11(6); CFSA, supra note 194, art. 104-bis(4)
(implementing the directive). Also, limited voting shares are covered only to the extent
that they did not confer preferential rights upon their holders (a case presently
unknown in Italian practice).
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through rules did not apply if the party promoting the takeover bid was not
subject to the same or equivalent provisions. 20 9
The second statute, which introduced measures aimed at coping with
the current economic crisis, 2 10 took a very different approach. The second
statute made both the neutrality and breakthrough rules optional. 2 11 As a
result, these rules were no longer applicable to listed Italian companies,
except for the rather remote possibility that individual companies opted
into one of the rules. 2 12 This amendment came as a surprise to many
observers because it effects a radical change not only with respect to the
2007 law first implementing the Directive, but also with regard to the board
neutrality regime that had been in place for nearly ten years under the
CFSA.213 The official link between this reversal and the financial turmoil
shows that the former may have been inspired by protectionism rather
than by genuine corporate governance preferences, to the extent that low
stock prices may have encouraged unwanted takeovers by foreign firms
which Italian companies could more easily resist.2 14
The third statute, which recently modified the second one and goes
into effect on July 1, 2010, reintroduced board neutrality as a default
rule.2 15 Companies intending to depart from this rule therefore will be
able to modify their charter accordingly before the new law enters into
force. The new regime does not affect the breakthrough rule because it is
still subject to an opt-in by corporations and appears to be grounded in the
reduced urgency for listed companies to be protected from takeovers once
the stock markets have recovered part of their losses.2 16
4. Spain
Spain implemented the Takeover Directive through Law No. 6 of April
12, 2007.217 Before the Directive's implementation, secondary legislation
209. CFSA, supra note 194, art. 104-ter(l).
210. See Decree-Law No. 185, art. 13, Nov. 29, 2008, Supplemento Ordinario No.
263/L alla Gazz. Uff. No. 280, Nov. 29, 2008, converted into Decree-Law No. 2,Jan. 28,
2009, Supplemento Ordinario No. 14/L alla Gazz. Uff. No. 22, Jan. 1, 2009, which
amended Articles 104, 104-bis, and 104-ter of the CFSA.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. But see Luca Enriques, A Diecd Anni dal Testo Unico della Finanza: il Ruolo delle
Autorita di Vigilanza, 8, http://www.consob.it/main/documenti/Pubblicazioni/Audi-
zioni/intervento enriques_20081029.pdf (Italy) (arguing that abolition of the board
neutrality rule could remove a disincentive for entrepreneurs to open their companies to
the stock market).
215. See Decree-Law No. 146, art. 1(3), Sept. 25, 2009, Gazz. Uff. No. 246, Oct. 10,
2009.
216. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Un Nuovo Giro di Giostra per la Passivity Rule, LA VOCE,
Oct. 6, 2009, available at http://www.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina1001316-351.html
(offering criticism).
217. Ley 6/2007 of April 12, 2007 (B.O.E. 2007, 7787). The new law deeply
reformed Spanish takeover regulation, particularly by overhauling complex rules on
mandatory bids, raising criticism of the Spanish system. See Benito Arruftada, Critica a
la Regulaci6n de OPAs, 203 REVISTA DE DERECHO MERCAN-IL 29 (1992); Juan FernAndez-
Armesto, Las OPAs y el Mercado de Control Empresarial: Un Balance de Diez Aiios de
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provided the primary foundation for the regulation of takeovers in
Spain. 2 18 Post-bid defenses were subject to a passivity rule forbidding
defensive measures after the bid's authorization by the Spanish Securities
Commission, the Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). 2 19
Previous law did not specifically address the consequences of post-bid
shareholder authorization of takeover defenses, though some scholars
interpreted the law as allowing for such authorization on the theory that
the board was only forbidden to adopt defensive measures on its own initi-
ative.2 20 The new takeover provisions include the European board-neutral-
ity rule requiring shareholders' approval of all post-bid defenses.
2 2 1
Experiencia, 227 REViSTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 37 (1998); Ana Felicitas Mufioz Perez,
Nueva Propuesta Comunitaria Sobre Regimen de OPAs y Reforma del Reglamento en Nues-
tro Pais, 20 REViSTA DE DERECHO DE SOCIEDADES 417 (2003); Fernando Sanchez Calero,
Regimen Jurfdico de las Ofertas Publicas de Adquisici6n (OPAs), in COMENTARIO SISTEMAT-
ICO DEL REAL DECRETO 1.197/1991 (1993); Fundaci6n de Estudios Financieros, Observa-
tory on Reforms of the European Financial Market (2006), (Foundation Papers No. 17,
2006), available at http://www.ieaf.es/_imgadmin/118823881017.1.pdf; see generally
Alberto J. Tapia Hermida, El Regimen de las Ofertas Ptiblicas de Adquisici6n de Acciones
(OPAs) en la Uni6n Europea y en Espaiia (Universidad Complutense, Documentos de
Trabajo del Departamento de Derecho Mercantil 2008/20, 2008), available at http://
eprints.ucm.es/7900/1/A.. Tapia.R%C3%A9gimenOPAs.pdf.
218. See Art. 60 of the Ley del Mercado de Valores [Stock Market Law] (B.O.E. 1988,
18764) (delegating the regulation of takeover bids and post-bid defences to secondary
legislation) .
219. See Art. 14 of Real Decreto 1197/1991 Sobre Regimen de las Ofertas Publicas de
Adquisici6n de Valores (B.O.E. 1991, 19740) (requiring the target's board to abstain
from any transaction that either is not executed in the ordinary course of business or
may frustrate the offer. Three types of transactions were specifically forbidden: (1) issu-
ing shares, bonds or other securities entitling to underwrite or purchase the former
instruments, unless this is done purely to execute previous resolutions of the sharehold-
ers meeting; (2) trading in the target's shares with the aim of interfering with the offer;
(3) selling or encumbering corporate assets in order to frustrate the offer or affect the
same). Other actions were allowed to the board, such as the search for a white knight
and the performance of transactions executed well in advance of a bid and without the
intent to frustrate it. See Luis Fernandez de la Gindara & Manuel Sanchez Alvarez,
Limitaci6n de la Actuacion del Organo de Administraci6n de Sociedad Afectada por el
Lanzamiento de una Oferta Puiblica de Adquisici6n, 18 REVISTA DE DERECHO DE SOCIEDADES
231 (2002); Jose M. Garrido, La Actuaci6n de los Administradores de una Sociedad Frente
a una OPA Hostil, in 3 DERECHO DE SOCIEDADES. LIBRO HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR FERNANDO
SANCHEZ CALERO 2719 (Aria Navarro Salinas ed., 2002).
220. See Santiago Jose Gonzdlez-Varas Ibdfiez, Controles Administrativos Sobre una OPA
y Posibilidades de Defensa, 22 REViSTA DE DERECHO BANCARIO Y BURSATtL 251, 255 (2003);
Javier Garcia de Enterria Lorenzo Veldzquez, Los Recursos y Acciones Contra las OPAs
Como Medida Defensiva, 201 REViSTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL 423, 437 (1991). Others
argued that Spanish law carried a pure passivity rule requiring the target company to
abstain from post-bid defences. See GAndara & Alvarez, supra note 219, at 232; Carlos
L. Aparicio Roqueiro, Regulaci6n de las OPA: Teoria Economica, Regulaci6n Europea y
Ofertas sobre Empresas Espahiolas 44 (Comisi6n Nacional del Mercado de Valores, 2007),
available at http://www.cnmv.es/publicaciones/MON2007_20.pdf.
221. See Art. 60-bis of the Ley del Mercado de Valores 24/1988 of July 28, 1988
(B.O.E. 1988, 18764) as modified by Ley No. 6/2007 of April 12, 2007 (B.O.E. 2007,
7787). See also Fernando G6mez Pomar & Isabel S.ez Lacave, La Eficacia del Deber de
Pasividad de los Administradores Sociales en Presencia de una OPA: Mecanismos Privados
Frente a Publicos, 1 INDRET: REVISTA PARA EL ANALISIS DEL DERECHO 412 (2007), available
at http://www.indret.com/pdf/412_es.pdf; Isabel Fernandez Torres, Luces y Sombras en
la Reforma de OPAs: el Papel de la Junta General en Relaci6n con las Medidas Defensivas
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However, this rule is subject to reciprocity, provided that a resolution has
been taken to this effect by the shareholders' meeting under the rules con-
cerning charter amendments not more than eighteen months before the
bid.2 22
Spain has not implemented the European breakthrough rule, except
for allowing individual companies to opt into its effect by charter amend-
ment pursuant to a shareholders' meeting resolution. 223 Pre-bid defenses
generally are allowed under Spanish law.2 24 Voting caps are expressly per-
mitted by the Stock Corporations Law and are widely used by listed com-
panies, thirty percent of which include voting caps in their articles of
association. 225 These caps are intended to make takeovers more difficult: a
bid must be made conditional upon removal of the relevant charter's provi-
sion by the general meeting, for the bidder could not otherwise acquire
control of the target. 226 However, multiple voting shares, which could also
be used to enhance corporate control by blockholders, are forbidden. 22 7
Because the law wants to keep some proportionality between voting and
non-voting shareholders, non-voting shares, which could similarly enhance
the voting power of controlling shareholders, are rarely used and can only
be issued within the limit of fifty percent of the share capital. 22 8 The
defenses found in the charters of listed companies also include
supermajority rules for shareholders' meetings.2 29 Similar clauses can be
included in a company's charter with the aim of raising the percentage of
share capital that a bidder should acquire to gain control of the target. 230
Moreover, shareholder agreements have been entered into in twenty per-
(Universidad Compultense, Documentos de Trabajo del Departamento de Derecho Mer-
cantil, 2008/18, 2008), available at http://eprints.ucm.es/7755; Javier Garcia de Enter-
ria Lorenzo Velazquez, El Deber de Pasividad de los Administratores de la Sociedad
Afectada por una OPA, 2 REvisTA DE DERECHO DEL MERCADO DE VALORES 89 (2008).
222. See Art. 60-bis of the Ley del Mercado de Valores, supra note 221.
223. See id. (requiring a resolution of the shareholders' meeting under the rules appli-
cable to charter's amendments).
224. See Gandara & Alvarez, supra note 219, at 235; Lorenzo VelAzquez, supra note
221, at 439; Juan Sdnchez-Calero Guilarte, La Armonizaci6n Disgregante: La Directiva de
OPAS y el Pricipio de Neutralizaci6n de Medidas Defensivas 23 (Universidad Complutense,
Documentos de Trabajo del Departamento de Derecho Mercantil, No. 2006/3, 2006),
available at http://eprints.ucm.es/5624/1/sancalero.pdf.
225. See Fundaci6n de Estudios Financieros, Observatorio de Gobierno Corporativo de
las Grandes Sociedades Cotizadas en el Mercado de Valores Espaiol (IBEX-35) 2004 40
(Papeles de la Fundacion, No. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ieaf.es/_img-admin/
118823853714.pdf [hereinafter Observatorio de Gobierno Corporativo].
226. See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-
Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 344 (2003).
227. Id. at 327.
228. Arts. 50, 90-92 of the Ley de Sociedades An6nimas (B.O.E. 1989, 30361). Share
transfer restrictions are generally permitted (save for the unconditional ones), but can-
not be adopted by listed companies, the shares of which must be freely transferable. Id.
Art. 63; Art. 27f of the Reglamento de las Bolsas Oficiales de Comercio (B.O.E. 1967,
10011).
229. See Observatorio de Gobierno Corporativo, supra note 224.
230. See Richard S. Ruback, An Overview of Takeover Defenses, in MERGERS AND AcQuI-
SITIONS 49, 57-58 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988), available at http://papers.nber.org/chap-
ters/c5821.pdf?new_window=1.
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cent of the Spanish listed companies, mainly for the purpose of enhancing
the voting power of the relevant parties and blocking their shares with
respect to potential bidders. 23 1 These agreements are valid under Spanish
law provided they are adequately disclosed. 23 2 The rejection of the Euro-
pean breakthrough rule therefore leaves the Spanish barriers to takeovers
substantially unaffected-a result that appears to reflect a relatively high
degree of protectionism for target managers. 23 3
5. United Kingdom
Takeovers in the United Kingdom traditionally have been subject to the
City Code, which bidders and targets in the City of London followed volun-
tarily under the supervision of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, a pri-
vate body responsible for the interpretation and revision of the Code.2 34
The Takeover Directive is aimed at "coordinating the laws, regulations,
administrative provisions, codes of practice and other arrangements of the
Member States, including arrangements established by organisations officially
authorised to regulate the markets .... ",235 This statement clearly was
intended to authorize the City Code to continue in operation in the United
Kingdom. Nonetheless, the Directive had to be transposed in the member
states through "laws, regulations and administrative provisions" 236 -i.e.,
public regulation-which can be complemented by private codes and simi-
lar arrangements. Moreover, the authority or authorities competent to
supervise takeover bids must be either "public authorities, associations or
private bodies recognised by national law or by public authorities
expressly empowered for that purpose by national law."'23 7 This provision
is broad enough to cover the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers as a supervi-
231. See PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE, supra note 128, at 73.
232. Art. 7 of Ley de Sociedades An6nimas, supra note 228; Art. 112 of Ley del Mer-
cado de Valores, supra note 221. Pyramidal groups are found in twenty-three percent of
listed companies in Spain and cross-shareholdings exist for five percent of these compa-
nies. See Observatorio de Gobierno Corporativo, supra note 225.
233. For example, Endesa, Spain's largest electricity company, after becoming the tar-
get of a takeover bid from E.ON of Germany, was rescued by Acciona and Enel, the
Italian utility, under a strategy clearly orchestrated by the Spanish Government. After
coming to control jointly a total of forty-six percent of the target's capital, Acciona and
Enel launched a takeover bid for Endesa. At the same time, they agreed with E.ON that,
in exchange for withdrawing from the contest, the same would acquire from Endesa a
portfolio of energy assets across Europe. See How Not To Block a Takeover, THE ECONO-
MIST, April 7, 2007, at 75. The bidders also agreed on their joint-governance of Endesa.
The relevant conditions were made public and show the bidders' willingness to appease
the Spanish Government, which was openly hostile to the E.ON's bid. See Mark Mulli-
gan, Acciona and Enel Launch Their Promised Bid for Endesa, FIN. TIMES, April 12, 2007,
at 25.
234. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS & MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE Al (9th ed. 2009)
(U.K.), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/
code.pdf.
235. See Directive, supra note 81, art. 1(1) (emphasis supplied).
236. Id. art. 21(1).
237. Id art. 4(1).
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sory authority; 238 however, it also requires the Panel's activities to be
placed within a legal framework. 239
The United Kingdom implemented the Takeover Directive in several
stages. First, in 2005, the Department of Trade and Industry published a
Consultative Document including detailed proposals for the implementa-
tion of the Directive. 240 Based on this document, Parliament enacted the
2006 Companies Act as the basic implementing framework. 241 This stat-
ute, however, left the detailed rules to the City Code. 242 The City Code
gives the power to promulgate these rules to the Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers, 24 3 which will continue to give rulings on the interpretation, appli-
cation, and effect of the Code.244
With regard to takeover defenses, the board neutrality rule already was
at the heart of the City Code in rule 21-which no doubt influenced the
formation of article 9 of the Directive .245 The relevant implementing
power was left to the Panel by the 2006 Companies Act,2 4 6 and the Panel
retained its original rule 21, except for amendments required by the differ-
ent wording of the Directive's provision.247 However, no reciprocity was
allowed-the theory being that to do so would have undermined the princi-
ples underlying the board neutrality rule. 248
The United Kingdom did riot adopt the breakthrough rule.249 On the
one hand, no restrictions are foreseen under U.K. company law on the way
238. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers,
and Why?- The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. LJ.
1727, 1788 (2007).
239. Id.
240. See DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUST., COMPANY LAW IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN
DIRECTIVE ON TAKEOVER BIDS: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT (2005) (U.K.) [hereinafter CON-
SULTATIVE DOCUMENT], available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file10384.pdf.
241. The Takeovers Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulations were created to
meet the implementation deadline. They were framed as interim regulations because the
key provisions had to be incorporated as primary legislation within the Company Law
Reform Bill. See The Takeovers Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulations, 2006,
S.I. 2006/1183 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20061183.htm
242. DEP'T TRADE & INDUS., EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE COMPANIES ACT 2006
(COMMENCEMENT No. 2, CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS, TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS AND SAV-
INGS) ORDER 2007, 9-10 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2007/em/
uksiem_20071093_en.pdf.
243. See Companies Act, 2006, c.46 § 943 (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.
uk/ACTS/acts2006/pdf/ukpga-20060046_en.pdf (conferring to the Panel the power to
implement several of the Directive's provisions. The Panel remains an unincorporated
body, with scope to decide on its internal structures and operational framework, and
continues to have rights and obligations under the common law.).
244. Id. § 945. Other sections provide for information to the Panel, id. §§ 947-948,
regulatory co-operation, id. § 950, hearings and appeals, contravention of the rules and
sanctions, id. §§ 952-956, and funding.
245. See CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 240, at 26-27.
246. See Companies Act, supra note 243, § 943.1.
247. On the relevant differences, see THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAKEOVERS DIRECTIVE: PROPOSALS RELATING TO AMENDMENTS TO BE
MADE TO THE TAKEOVER CODE (2005) (U.K.), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.
org.uk/new/consultation/DATA//PCP%20200505.pdf.
248. See CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 240, at 28.
249. See id. at 27-28 (providing the rationale for rejecting the breakthrough rule).
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companies can structure their share capital and control. 250 On the other,
few listed companies are found in the United Kingdom with differential
voting structures or restrictions on the transfer of shares or voting rights,
mainly as a result of market forces. 25 1 In addition, a breakthrough regime
might not have the desired effect of promoting more open takeover mar-
kets, as companies would simply move to other jurisdictions or try to cir-
cumvent the breakthrough mechanisms. 2 52 As required under the
Directive, listed companies are, however, entitled to opt into the break-
through rule.25
3
C. Our Model and the Directive's Implementation
Our model predicts that takeover regulation in member states will be
more target-friendly than the regulation at the EU level. This prediction is
confirmed in the implementing legislation just discussed. Each of the
jurisdictions we examined opted out of the breakthrough rules, thus leav-
ing open a wide range for the operation of privately crafted takeover
defenses. The board neutrality rule was more popular, but, even here, two
of the five countries-Italy and Germany-opted out of the Directive. Over-
all, the pattern strongly confirms the prediction of more friendly takeover
rules at the member-state level.
Our model also predicts that differences among member states will
reflect differences of the political power of targets and bidders: where bid-
ders are more powerful, or targets are more threatened, we are likely to see
a greater scope of defensive measures. Here, we also find evidence tending
to confirm the prediction, although our conclusions are more tentative.
We observe that protectionism tends to be relatively greater in jurisdictions
where targets have more to fear from a takeover.
In Germany, the presence of substantial numbers of publicly traded
firms places target firms at substantial risk-as illustrated by Vodaphone's
successful bid for Mannesmann and by worries that Volkswagen might be a
potential target.2 54 At the same time, powerful labor interests, represented
on German supervisory boards, can be expected to resist takeovers that
may threaten jobs. 2 55 Their ability to do so might be diminished if they
legally were required to adopt a posture of neutrality with respect to take-
over bids.2 56 Given these political conditions, we would predict that Ger-
many would be one of the most protective of all member states. Such is, in
fact, the case: Germany has adopted the strongest anti-takeover measures
of any of the countries we studied, rejecting both the breakthrough and
board neutrality rules of the Directive. 25 7
250. See id. at 27.
251. See PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE, supra note 128, at 77-80.
252. See CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 240, at 27-28.
253. Companies Act, supra note 243, § 966-69.
254. See Tuchinsky, supra note 118, at 698-701.
255. See Hopner & Jackson, supra note 174, at 32-35.
256. See id. at 46-47.
257. See supra Part III.B.2.
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France also hosts a substantial population of publicly traded firms
that might be subject to hostile takeovers. France, however, does not main-
tain a system of co-determination like the German one. 258 Labor interests
in France thus are not as strongly motivated to resist the board neutrality
rules. This suggests that France would tend to be more receptive to the
board neutrality rules than the breakthrough rules. This is in fact the case:
France opted out of the breakthrough rules and authorized poison-pill-like
defensive measures but did not opt out of board neutrality. 2 59 Incumbent
managers in France may also take solace from the Danone Amendment,
which allows the French financial regulator to place certain impediments
in the path of takeover bids considered unfriendly to the interests of the
French state. 2 60
Italian firms do not have labor representatives in either boards of
directors or supervisory boards. 2 61 Compared with France and Germany,
moreover, Italian firms face a lower threat of takeovers due to the fact that
so many Italian companies, even ones of substantial size, are family con-
trolled.2 62 Family blockholding is a very effective anti-takeover device. 263
We predict, therefore, that Italy will be more receptive than these other
countries to the board neutrality and breakthrough rules. Until recently,
this prediction was borne out.26 4 Even before the Directive, Italian law had
contained the equivalent of board neutrality standards and imposed sub-
stantial breakthrough provisions. 265 Because most potential targets had no
reason to fear these rules, they did not mobilize sufficient opposition
against them, and the interest of potential bidders was correspondingly
larger. 2 66 The first Italian implementing statute carried out this pattern,
adopting both the board neutrality and breakthrough provision of the
258. EIR1K G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 389 (2000).
259. See supra Part III.B.1.
260. See id.
261. The prevailing corporate governance structure in Italy consists of a board of
directors and a board of statutory auditors. A few listed companies have either a two-tier
or a one-tier structure, as allowed by the 2003 company law reform. See Guido Fer-
rarini, Paolo Giudici & Mario Stella Richter, Company Law Reform in Italy: Real Pro-
gress?, 69 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 658, 676 (2005).
262. One study reports that 65.8% of Italian listed companies have a blocking share-
holder minority of at least 25%. Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, Introduction, in THE CON-
TROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 1, 22 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., 2001).
263. See Martin Holmen & Eugene Nivorozhkin, The Impact of Family Ownership and
Dual Class Shares on Takeover Risk, 17 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 785 (2007).
264. See supra Part III.B.3.
265. Id.
266. See Luca Enriques, Modernizing Italy's Corporate Governance Institutions: Mission
Accomplished? 32 (University of Bologna, European Corporate Governance Institute,
Law Working Paper No. 123/2009, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1400
999 (arguing that recently almost no company existed in Italy that could really be taken
over via a hostile bid); Marco Ventoruzzo, Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep's Cloth-
ing: Taking Armour & Skeel's Thesis to Continental Europe (Bocconi University, Legal
Studies Research, Paper No. 2008-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084
429 (arguing that, in concentrated ownership systems, controlling shareholders might
actually favor a board neutrality rule).
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Directive. 26 7 The second Italian statute opted out of both;2 68 however, we
interpret this in part as a gesture by the Berlusconi government to respond
to the burgeoning financial crisis as well as a favor to potential targets who
are significant supporters of the present government. The third Italian stat-
ute, however, recently reintroduced board neutrality as a default rule,
which substantially confirms our interpretation.
Spain, like Italy, has many family-owned firms which are substantially
protected from hostile takeovers due to large block ownership. 269 We
would predict, therefore, that Spain would adopt an intermediate level of
takeover protection. This prediction appears to be borne out. Spain's
implementing legislation adopts board neutrality but rejects the break-
through rules.2 70 Background law in Spain permits a substantial but not
unlimited array of takeover defenses that would otherwise be subject to
challenge under the breakthrough rules. 27 1 Spanish law thus provides sig-
nificant protections to incumbent managers, going well beyond what would
be permissible under the Directive in the absence of legislation opting out
of the breakthrough rules, but still less protection than is available in Ger-
many and France.
The United Kingdom presents a special case. Although U.K. target
firms are vulnerable to takeovers because they are publicly traded and lack
large family block ownership, the interests of potential bidders are also
strong.2 72 The United Kingdom has long been the financial center of
Europe, and the British government has a powerful interest in maintaining
that position. Thus it can be expected that U.K. law will cater, to a sub-
stantial extent, to the interests of big international and U.K.-based firms-
firms that are more likely to be bidders than targets.2 73 Where bidder
interests are strongly represented, takeover protections can be expected to
be relatively moderate. The City Code included a board passivity rule long
before the Takeover Directive, while the need for breakthrough rules was
267. See supra Part III.B.3.
268. See id.
269. Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European
Corporations, 65 J. FIN. EcON. 365, 379 (2002).
270. See supra Part 1II.B.4.
271. See id.
272. See Faccio & Lang, supra note 269.
273. John Armour and David Skeel explained these developments mainly by reference
to institutional investors, who became significant shareholders of listed companies
much earlier than in the United States and influenced rule-making, i.e., "the formation
of formal and informal norms that govern the operation of corporate enterprise."
Armour & Skeel, supra note 238, at 1771. However, the same scholars also acknowl-
edged that, by the time when the City Code was first adopted in 1968, most bids "were
driven by consolidation, and managers were just as likely to be bidders as targets in this
milieu." Id. at 1775-76. Sixty-nine percent of U.K. companies feature no CEM. PROPOR-
TIONALITY PRINCIPLE, supra note 128, at 77. Therefore, the board neutrality rule, in addi-
tion to encountering the favor of institutional investors, was easily accepted by potential
bidders/targets because of its evenhandedness. Armour & Skeel, supra note 238, at
1775-76.
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not felt given the limited presence of control enhancing mechanisms in
U.K. listed companies.2 74
Conclusion
This paper advances a simple theory of takeover regulation. The the-
ory has two parts. First, we posit that the observed pattern of rules can be
understood in part as a product of political forces operating at different
geographical levels and under different conditions of target and bidder
interests. The respective political powers of bidders and targets tend to be
a function of the geographic size of the territory within which a takeover
law operates: the larger the territory, the larger the power of bidders vis-A-
vis targets (and vice versa). Thus, other things being equal, we expect to
observe that takeover regulation will be increasingly target-friendly as the
geographic scope of regulation narrows. 'This prediction is powerfully con-
firmed by the evidence: takeover regulation in both Europe and the United
States is much more target-friendly at the smaller geographic level (U.S.
states or EU member states).
Second, holding geographic scope constant, we posit that the tenor of
takeover regulation will reflect the respective political interests of bidders
and targets within a given geographic area. Restrictive takeover rules can
be expected in jurisdictions where targets are strongly represented or feel
vulnerable to hostile bids; more liberal rules are to be expected in jurisdic-
tions where bidders are strongly present or targets are insulated from take-
over threats for reasons other than the takeover regime. Again, this
prediction appears borne out by the evidence. In particular, the theory
helps explain why Delaware, in the United States, and the United Kingdom,
in the EU, both administer regimes of takeover regulation that are relatively
more friendly to bidder interests than are the rules applied by other states
or countries.
274. See Ferrarini, supra note 5, at 18.
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